happy to report. For the word samizdat, I discovered after plowing through the wads of publications on the subject, is as difficult to handle as a strong samogon (not some cheap taburetka, mind you), though for very different reasons. Let me explain.
The notion "samizdat" seems to be unsettling on a number of grounds. As a particular mode of producing and disseminating nonconformist texts in the former Communist countries, it was an obvious challenge (if only by its very existence) to the information monopoly enjoyed by the state in a one-party political system. It has been an embarrassment, however, not just to the censor, but also to the critic wishing to pin down its categorical distinction: its "samizdatedness," to recycle Roman Jakobson's venerable concept. The formal properties of a text seem not to matter in this respect, nor sometimes does its content. A lyrical poem signed by a "wrong" author would be banned from the press just like an overtly antigovernmental proclamation. And, to muddy the water even further, one and the very same text that initially enjoyed official status could subsequently, for a variety of reasons, be consigned by party censors to the dustbin of history and there assume a shadowy, samizdat existence. But no seasoned reader from the region would have failed to distinguish between the two and have confused, so to speak, Pierre Menard's Don Quixote with Cervantes's identically worded novel. For, as Borges did not neglect to tell us, they are a function of very unlike contexts.
It is this heightened context-sensitivity that makes it rather hard for any commentator to articulate adequate generalizations about samizdat. The concept of "totalitarianism" that usually provides a convenient backdrop for any discussion of uncensored publishing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe exemplifies the perils of homogenizing some seventy years of Communism into an ahistoric sameness. Time did not stop even east of the Elbe River, and the degree of governmental grip over society ebbed and rose with its flow. Decisive for my discussion is the year 1956, which witnessed two events whose impact on the Marxist-Leninist mentality cannot be overestimated: Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party about Stalin's crimes and the Hungarian (counter)revolution. Milan Kundera's novel The Joke, published by the Czechoslovak Writers' Union house in 1967 only to join samizdat some two years later, artfully depicts the curious switch taking place in the midfifties from a euphoric and uncritical social utopia (in Karl Mannheim's sense of this word) poised to radically transform the world to an ideology: a set of worn-out beliefs defending the status quo of "socialism as is," despite the obvious gap between the stellar goals of the Communist project and their lackluster implementation.
Even though unofficial texts existed and circulated in the USSR and the people's democracies before 1956, samizdat as a significant network of alternative communication developed only after the demise of Stalinism, in the ideologically more relaxed atmosphere of the 1960s. And the period of détente added yet another wrinkle to the history of samizdat. The Helsinki Agreement of 1975, whose seventh point included "respect for human rights and fundamental freedom," made what was initially a purely domestic affair a matter of foreign policy that empowered Western governments to intercede on behalf of dissidents. Which, needless to say, provided a considerable boost to various civic initiatives across the Soviet bloc whose medium was samizdat.
To read the history of samizdat in a linear fashion-its gradual growth facilitated by the withering of the Communist state-would, however, be a gross oversimplification. Equally significant for the fortunes of the "second communicative circuit," as samizdat is sometimes called, were purely local conditions. Although all socialist countries in which it existed claimed allegiance to the same universal ideology, their developmental trajectories and social structures varied considerably. And these had a significant impact not only on the state's tolerance for dissent or the methods for dealing with it but also on the forms through which heterodox views were expressed. What would be acceptable in one country could easily be taboo in another. And furthermore, a loosening ideological grip did not automatically result in burgeoning samizdat. Thus following the bloody upheaval of 1956, Hungary turned gradually into the most permissive of the socialist countries: a coveted tourist destination for other East Europeans eager to taste the fruits of culture forbidden to them at home. Yet, whether despite this fact or, perhaps, because of it, Hungarian samizdat pales when compared to that of Poland, whose post-1956 history was a series of sharp confrontations between the Communist government and the opposition. From the daunting conditions there came the most massive underground publishing industry in Eastern Europe, employing regular printing presses and churning out many thousand editions of the most popular titles. It was entrenched deeply enough in the social fabric to survive the year and a half of martial law imposed by Polish authorities in the early 1980s (see, e.g., Gereben 1986: 16-19; Fedrigo and Sygnarski 1992) . I could augment my discussion with examples drawn from elsewhere, but these two suffice to illustrate that the vitality of samizdat had more to do with local cultural traditions than with the intensity of the political repression confronting it.
Finally, it is not just "when" and "where" that circumscribe what samizdat is but also the way that we conceptualize it. Because of its rather broad definition (exemplified by the OED entry above), it can be approached from many different, often incongruous perspectives. Since its inception during the Cold War, it has been treated above all as a weapon in the political clash of two incompatible systems. Accordingly, samizdat was presented in the West as a rebirth of free speech behind the Iron Curtain, defying ideological brainwashing by the Darth Vaders of the "Evil Empire." These were texts "which draw on the truth" (Solzhenitsyn 1972 : 7) by those not afraid of "living in truth" (Havel 1991: 147) . And to make sure that they found their intended audiences, munificent assistance was extended to disseminate them as widely as possible in their places of origin. Samizdat was, therefore, augmented by tamizdat: works from the East were either broadcast back through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty-the first and by far the largest repository of samizdat materials (Boiter 1972 )-or reprinted and, through a covert program funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), funneled to their respective homelands. According to the most recent estimate, within the period from 1956 to 1993, when this initiative was ended, some ten million books and periodicals found their serendipitous way to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Ostermann and Terzieva 2008) .
Since the end of the Cold War and its ideological vestiges, this strictly political understanding of samizdat has been challenged on a number of points. As Serguei Oushakine (2001) argues convincingly, dissident resistance to the Communist state in the USSR was not direct (as the disjunctive model of truth vs. lie would have it) but mimetic. The opposition enunciated its protest in the very language of the system against which it protested. Put simply, rather than advancing its own political platform that would offer an alternative type of regime, the dissidents' critique focused on the internal imperfections of the Communist system itself: whether there was a betrayal of Lenin's original vision of the proletarian state or, in less lofty terms, whether the state violated the rights guaranteed to citizens by the Soviet constitution.
Oushakine's observations about Soviet dissidents or dissidence are valid, mutatis mutandis, for other Eastern bloc countries as well. In 1982 Hungary, George Konrád (1984: 126) concluded in his book of essays with the suggestive title Antipolitics that confronting the government head-on would be foolhardy: "Democracy and independence, here and now, are not possible for us; the basic framework of political and economic power cannot be reformed to the point where new decision-making centers, independent of the imperial power center and incapable of being reabsorbed into it, might arise." Thus, he argued for a gradualist path toward social change, a reform of Communist Hungary through a step-by-step relaxation of existing restrictions.
Other students of samizdat share Oushakine's mistrust of the monochromatic cognitive optics inherited from the Cold War. In his all-encompassing study of late Soviet culture, Alexei Yurchak (2006) develops the most forceful critique to date of such an ideologically skewed approach. The fearinducing picture of the former Soviet Union as the devil incarnate might have been an effective tool for discrediting a political enemy, he maintains, but is altogether too simplistic for grasping the complexities of that society. Absolute binary oppositions like good and evil may obtain in fairy tales but rarely in real life. The first step in the right direction, the author argues, is to recognize that the Communist project, despite its confounding appearance, was not a totally unique phenomenon. As "a part of modernity," it shares with this period some of its deepest contradictions, especially "the split between the ideological enunciation (which reflects the theoretical ideals of the Enlightenment) and ideological rule (manifest in the practical concerns of the modern state's political authority)" (ibid.: 10).
But even before Yurchak, some scholars recognized the utility of a comparative perspective in studying the types of collective reaction to state repression. Mechanisms for preventing public communication of contention existed outside Communist societies as well, in Franco's Spain or many Latin American countries, among others, and local populations developed various strategies to mobilize against them. Leninist regimes, where the level of governmental control was relatively high, generated a specific variant of what Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller (2001) call "unobtrusive practices of contention." These, they claim, were strikingly similar across the entire Eastern bloc. The "practices" included "informal speech situations" (pubs, coffee shops, clubs where one could speak freely) and "duplicitous organizations" (recreational, cultural, or religious) sanctioned by the government but symbolically promulgating views that were to some degree contrary to the state's orthodoxy. The third and "the least unobtrusive of the various contentious practices characteristic of Leninist regimes" (ibid.: 366) are "dissident circles," which have a special relevance to my topic. While the former two practices facilitated the existence of informal networks instrumental in reproducing and distributing samizdat, it is the latter that usually generated it. Yet though often stretching the limits of the permissible, many samizdat participants could still operate within the gray legal zone of the tolerable, and the punishment meted out by irked authorities might not have been judicial but purely extralegal, that is, economic or administrative forms of harassment (see also Skilling 1989) .
Samizdat, to move my discussion to the next level of abstraction, need not be juxtaposed just with similar networks of surreptitious communica-tion through which disgruntled citizens air views suppressed by those in power but can be compared also with the general circle of communication through which every book passes on its way from author to reader. Robert Darnton's (1990: 112) influential study of the printed culture in eighteenthcentury France captures this complex process mediated by a series of agents and involving many social forces, as diagrammed in figure 1.
Is this model, derived from the life cycle of a normal book-Gordon Johnston (1999) asks-applicable to book circulation that is as sui generis as samizdat? There are three problems, he holds, which involvement in an underground communicative network presents: "First, it increases the overall level of commercial and physical risk that to some extent is anticipated through costing and pricing decisions. Second, 'illegality' causes some disruption to the flow of information that publishers and booksellers require in order to make informed decisions about what to publish and what to stock. And, finally, 'illegality' constitutes a problem for readers or potential readers in that they have to find a source of illicit material at minimal risk to themselves" (ibid.: 120-21). Johnston's concerns with the economic underpinnings of samizdat are opportune insofar as they lead away from regarding this activity solely as purveyance of morality or truth. At the same time, however, they open a new set of problems, some of which the author himself points out. How relevant is economics to an enterprise that at first glance lacks any commercial rationale? ) is correct in arguing that this question "does not obviate the need to explore the economics of the network of exchanges on the lifecycle of the book," and he offers several hypotheses on how it probably affected the selection process of publishable titles, the organization of the communication network, etc. But this avoids a larger question that should be asked: why did some East Europeans engage in activities from which they could hardly profit monetarily and that ultimately could be detrimental to their well-being? One could perhaps muse about the inscrutable Slavic soul, but the German, Hungarian, or Romanian practitioners of samizdat defied instrumental rationality in a similar fashion. This question, however, Darnton's model is unable to handle. Among its shortcomings listed by critics, two are pertinent for my argument. One flaw, pointed out by Peter McDonald (1997), is its totalizing tendency, which treats all book-mediated communication as essentially the same. Texts that are literary percolate through a social network in the same fashion as those that are theological or scientific. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's notion of field-a semiautonomous sphere of discourse ruled by its own set of conventions-McDonald reconceives the circuit of communication as a dynamic and structured multiplicity of correlated subcircuits that are both self-governed yet open to exogenous stimuli. Second, and more important, "the agents' positions in the culture are not only defined horizontally, in terms of their function in the circuit, but vertically, in terms of their status in the hierarchy of circuits" (ibid.: 111).
Field as a system of social positions, then, is a set of power relations through which competing agents strive to appropriate capital in the broadest sense of this word (i.e., what is desirable for them). It is the plurality of the capitals pursued in this process and their mutual convertibility that explains why individuals engaged in a field of culture might behave in a way contrary to the utility-maximization model. In his discussion of the French literary world in the late nineteenth century (to which I can hardly do justice here), Bourdieu (1993: 115-31 ) speaks of two competing subfields of production: the "large-scale" and the "restricted," each using a different set of criteria to justify its respective undertakings. The former is, indeed, driven primarily by crass profitability where money alone matters. The latter, on the other hand, stems from concerns that are literature specific: beauty, tradition, reputation. The capital (i.e., status) thus gained through the latter is, to be sure, rather ephemeral and purely symbolic by its very nature. Yet despite this, it is a fungible ultimately convertible into economic capital when a writer who hitherto expressed disdain for any tangible rewards cashes in on the acquired artistic prestige, exchanging, so to speak, fame for money.
With these insights in mind, we can return to "samizdat" or, more precisely, to Ann Komaromi's reframing of this concept in Bourdieuan terms. In "reading" the French sociologist "artistically rather than scientifically" (Komaromi 2007: 629) , she draws an intriguing parallel between the emer-gence of French intellectuels in the early twentieth century and the rise of the field of unofficial culture in the USSR some sixty years later. Like their precursors, toiling to open a creative space insulated from the mundane politics and economics of the bourgeois world, the Russian intelligentsia strove to create a field that would be autonomous and separate from the official Soviet discourse and institutions. "Primary" in this effort, Komaromi (ibid.: 620) observes, was the "uncensored production and circulation of texts." Bourdieu's model, Komaromi concedes, with its reliance on the Marxist view of social organization in terms of class struggle and on the limits imposed by the particular cultural configuration he analyzes, cannot be applied wholesale to the late Soviet situation, and she lists some important differences. First, in the field of unofficial culture, a neat separation from economics and politics cannot be made. It is a hybrid structure (similar perhaps to McDonald's "multiplicity of correlated sub-circuits") that comprises a variety of discursive subfields (legal, political, artistic), each making its own bid for autonomy from two rivals: Soviet officialdom and other agents who claim autonomy within the larger field. Second, the existence of tamizdat adds an important potential (unanticipated by Bourdieu) to the conversion of symbolic capital into economic capital. "Samizdat texts," as Komaromi (2007: 628) shrewdly puts it, "were in some sense the currency of the unofficial culture," and their publication abroad could generate an income that was quite high if judged by local standards. The demise of the ancien régime in Russia and Eastern Europe, I would add, opened yet another window of opportunity for turning a symbolic capital into an economic one. A sudden Umwertung aller Werte-the restoration of capitalism in that part of the world-keenly analyzed within the Bourdieuan framework by Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley (1998) offered samizdat authors another possibility for joining "large-scale" literary production. This time, however, in the domestic media market.
Earlier versions of the essays brought together in this special double issue of Poetics Today were originally delivered at a conference devoted to the topic of samizdat at the University of Pennsylvania in April 2006, which I attended. These essays are notable for several reasons. They debunk, first of all, the naive political understanding of samizdat inherited from the Cold War era and offer instead a multifaceted and nuanced interpretation of this remarkable social phenomenon. Secondly and equally importantly, they not only rejuvenate this category intellectually but also extend its borders far beyond the usual. Defying a narrow understanding of samizdat in terms of literature alone, several essays argue convincingly that other media belong to it as well, and they substantiate this claim with examples drawn from unofficial songs, paintings, and films as well as from texts outside art altogether. Finally, in dealing with samizdat across national borders and traditions, the authors whom I have the honor of introducing offer among them a broad comparative perspective on this phenomenon in its manifold cultural heterogeneity.
The contributions can be divided into roughly three groups: (1) theoretical essays aiming to provide a general understanding of samizdat and methods for classifying it, (2) articles dealing with this subject from an archival perspective, and (3) detailed studies of particular manifestations of samizdat in the broadest possible sense of this term. Let me start my discussion with the first group. Ann Komaromi's and Martin Machovec's theoretical probes are unlike each other in more than one respect: the former focuses on Soviet material, and her approach is rather speculative; the latter is concerned exclusively with the Czech version of this phenomenon, and he strives to be descriptive. What they share is the robust belief that the distinctive feature of samizdat is an innate fuzziness that eludes traditional scholarly approaches. But while for Komaromi this insight is a springboard for deconstructing this concept from within by laying bare the numerous antinomies that engender it, Machovec counters the lure of relativism through a rigorous taxonomic approach. Well aware of the fact that the categorical identity of samizdat is but a network of crisscrossing and overlapping features-that traditional criticism would judge as merely epiphenomenal-Machovec casts a wide typological net to catch this slippery subject. Classification of samizdat texts, he opines, should be based on the intentions of their publishers/distributors, textual eponymy, the types of printed matter (books, periodicals, leaflets, etc.) as well as several other criteria that he lists.
One of the essential peculiarities of samizdat that Komaromi points out is the precariousness of its material vehicle. What is available to us of it is a fraction of the original corpus, and even more important, the very notion of original seems inappropriate for texts circulating across national boundaries in a variety of unlike replicas beyond any authorial control. This fact presents a formidable challenge to archivists, like Olga Zaslavskaya, charged with preserving this fragile cultural heritage for posterity. On what basis is she to sort out the documents at hand, separating the proverbial grain worthy of storage from the disposable chaff ? And this is not just a quaint antiquarian game, she is quick to inform us. Historical repositories are never value-free stockpiles of facts but prima facie social constructs. They mold the past according to the specific agenda of the present, as is clearly illustrated by the samizdat collection from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (indifferent to purely artistic texts) of which she is currently a curator.
If Zaslavskaya's métier is gathering samizdat archival material, a historian, Alexander Gribanov, sieves through the existing archives of the Soviet Communist Party and of its secret police to glimpse from internal memos-once top secret stuff-how the authorities regarded those thwarting the state-imposed monopoly on information. The two documents he unearthed in his quest date from 1970-71 and are directly related to the problematics of samizdat as well as to the methods for suppressing it. Most significant, as Gribanov stresses, is the KGB's sheepish admission that underground publishing was too burgeoning an enterprise to be checked by police measures alone. Equally intriguing, he observes, is the fact that these documents devoted to the production and dissemination of uncontrolled information do not mention a technologically more advanced magnitizdat, that is, the rerecording and self-distribution of live audio tapes, the scope of which far exceeded the domain of sub rosa publishing.
What escaped the prying eyes of the party apparatchiks J. Martin Daugherty explores in detail. Magnitizdat, I would infer from his remarks, might not have been included in the KGB report because this form of entertainment enjoyed near-universal popularity among Soviet youths across social strata and political backgrounds. It is quite likely that the children or grandchildren of those who authored the two documents showcased by Gribanov listened to the tapes of Bulat Okudzhava' or Vladimir Vysotskii's songs either at their own home or at their friends'. Both of these cult figures managed to tread the tenuous line between artistic and political dissent, which, according to Daugherty, was the defining feature of magnitizdat as a whole. Its impact on Russian society, he argues, was decisive but operated in a subtle, inconspicuous manner. The raw, "amateurish" style of the avtorskie pesni (songs that bards composed to their own lyrics) offered a striking contrast to the polished and highly orchestrated music emanating from the state-controlled media. In this way, they managed to project a new kind of intimate social space (of friends singing to each other) that stood at a marked variance from the official public space resounding with mass and heroic songs.
By combining the sonorous with the verbal, magnitizdat lies at the very boundary of samizdat as traditionally understood. But so do the "wordpaintings" of Erik Bulatov, the subject of Liliana Milkova's penetrating analysis, which straddle the textual and the visual. The invasion of one's living space by letters, Yury Olesha (1975 Olesha ( [1927 : 6) already observed in the late 1920s, was one of the distinctive features of the Soviet epoch. And the omnipresent political posters-striking pictures with brief propaganda slogans-greatly contributed to this effect. Bulatov drew his artistic inspiration from these ubiquitous ideologemes. Yet, while in the original Stalinist posters, Milkova explains, the image complemented the dominant inscription, Bulatov's works deliberately decoupled the visual from the written, pitting the two media semantically against each other. His "wordpaintings" are logical double binds: complex signs whose two discrete levels of signification contradict each other. It is as if, in this striking manner, the author wished to comment graphically on the inner paradoxicality of the entire Communist project (see Yurchak above) .
Returning now to the realm of literature proper, the essays by Leona Toker, Stiliana Milkova, and Joseph Benatov focus on three individual writers and question the received image of samizdat as a happy fiefdom of discursive freedom and truth opposed to official literature, the mouthpiece of governmental propaganda. Varlam Shalamov's stellar reputation arose from The Kolyma Tales-a collection of chilling stories from the Gulagcirculating in his homeland as samizdat and eventually published abroad in translation as well as in Russian. But on February 23, 1972, in a letter to the Soviet Writers Union's weekly, the Literary Gazette, Shalamov, to the consternation of all, dissociated himself from the publication of his works abroad. This curious act, Toker insists, should not be viewed as an opportunistic move by an old and sick author wishing to find a modus vivendi with the oppressive regime. Shalamov's unhappiness with sam/tamizdat was rooted in "the material instability" of the text (Komaromi's term). True, samizdat enabled Shalamov to write in a way that would be officially impossible. Yet this freedom had its price. It denied him something else that he valued as a writer: authorial control over his own work. That work was mutilated, on its fortuitous way to the reader, by numerous copyists, editors, and/or translators, often guided by the sincere conviction that they were in fact improving it. Such strong resentment against being made the helpless object of a stranger's manipulation might have been expected, Toker explains, from a man who spent almost eighteen years in prisons and labor camps, where his entire existence in its most intimate detail was always controlled by others. Joseph Benatov's "demystification" of tamizdat raises the tough question of the alleged veracity of unofficial literature. He approaches the subject from a rather unusual perspective: the literary rendition of the Czech dissidents' "merry ghetto" in a novella by Philip Roth, The Prague Orgy-whose hero's mission impossible was to smuggle out from behind the Iron Curtain an unpublished literary manuscript. Roth, it must be stressed, is not the only English-speaking writer intrigued by the tenebrous world of Czech dissent. Tom Stoppard's play Rock 'n' Roll (2006) , celebrating the Prague underground rock band the Plastic People of the Universe, evinces a similar interest. Benatov's argument is rather subtle and thus resistant to a simple brachyology. It centers on the celebrity status of Milan Kundera in the West and the resentment it bred among his fellow writers left in Czechoslovakia. Exiled to France in 1975, Kundera came to be viewed abroad as the authoritative voice of independent Czech literature that had been driven underground by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact in 1968. Through his fiction, according to Benatov, Roth sides with Kundera's domestic detractors, who charged this all too successful émigré with commercializing their plight for a Western audience, thus stripping it of its authenticity. Whether we subscribe to this reading of Roth's work or not, it provides further ammunition to Komaromi's theoretical claim (quoted above) regarding the fierce competition among agents in the field of independent culture: the dual thrust of their bid for autonomy, directed simultaneously against Communist officialdom and against claimants other than themselves (Kundera in this case), who were perceived to be monopolizing the stage.
If escaping censorship, as Kundera's case bears witness, does not render the author infallible, submitting to it-conditio sine qua non of official literature-did not necessarily make him a liar. Iurii Trifonov's best-selling novel The House on the Embankment (1976), spotlighted by Stiliana Milkova, was brought out by a government-owned publishing house and, thus, vetted for loyalty. But its intricate texture, which weaves together "memory, truth, and history," manages to bring out of oblivion, Milkova notes, ghosts of the shameful past that the Soviet government wished to suppress. The ability to do so, however, required a special strategy by the author. While independent writers could directly address the traumatic spots of Soviet history, Trifonov's negative assessment of Soviet society's moral health was cast in a delicate game of hide and seek: outsmarting the censor while, at the same time, passing on to the reader his critical message. If the raison d'être of samizdat is to supply citizenry with information filtered out by official channels, Trifonov's novel performs, it is easy to see, a similar function, the recourse to Aesopian language employed notwithstanding.
The delicate balancing act of giving God his due without arousing Caesar's suspicion, performed so adroitly by Trifonov, was not an unusual stratagem within the Soviet bloc. In Bulgaria, a country without any genuine political dissidence, it was the norm, as Albena Lutzkanova-Vassileva explains. Participation in the official establishment during the day and in an oppositional group(s) during the evening did not bother the local Communist Party a bit. With printed samizdat virtually nonexistent, resistance to Todor Zhivkov's government took a curious theoretical/discursive turn. The two groups focused on by the author-the Seminar and Synthesis1-opted for attacking the hegemony of Communist ideology on its own turf: by disrupting the symbolic order that engendered the existing political order. The tactic was justified, these Bulgarian intellectuals believed, because the socialist project was in its essence autopoietic: a selfreproducing fiction sustaining itself through a total discursive monopoly. Assuming the language of their foe as protective mimicry, the members of the two groups conspired to penetrate the symbolic mechanism of Communist power and, by magnifying the communicative disorder inherent in it, to implode the system from within.
Even from my brief description of the Seminar and Synthesis groups' program of overthrowing the Bulgarian government by semiotic means, it should be clear that this is more a poetic than a political project. It was a local instantiation, I believe, of the general artistic tendency that in the late 1970s and the early 1980s emerged in virtually every Communist country: the transformation of the ideological symbols of the era into the aesthetic material of imaginative play. Equally significant about this new trend was its collective nature, the proliferation of closely knit groups, with a variety of makeshift worldviews (some quite esoteric, if not outright bizarre), carrying on such games. And to be included in such groups required more than just the production of material artifacts. A ludic way of living (some Bulgarian peculiarities of which Lutzkanova-Vassileva's essay describes) was a must. Alexei Yurchak's observations about two Leningrad artists' groups, proponents of radical alternative lifestyles, further explores this important dimension of the independent culture under Communism.
Yurchak, as noted above, is weary of the simple binary oppositions that in the past provided samizdat studies with a frame of reference. His field research in the Soviet Union yielded enough material for him to contest the Leninist/Schmittian conception of the Soviet state as a zero-sum game between friends and foes. With the state ideology of Marxism-Leninism nearly exhausted, the politics of opposing the government, according to his account, appeared to many citizens to be as meaningless as the one of imposing the government hegemony, and they often regarded the two as symbiotic. One of Stoppard's (2006: 37) characters formulated well this "cynical" stance pervading the entire Eastern bloc: "Policemen love dissidents like the Inquisition loved heretics. Heretics give meaning to the defenders of the faith." I use the word "cynical" advisedly, because performances of the Mit'ki group, one of Yurchak's exhibits, bear a strik-1. Of the two only Synthesis was an actual group of like-minded friends with a shared program. The Seminar is a collective label applied to several informal and overlapping groupings of students and junior faculty at the University of Sofia who in the 1980s participated in the same academic seminars.
ing resemblance to the antics of Cynicism's father, Diogenes of Sinope. Chafing under the growing power of the centralizing Athenian state (with Plato's Republic as its philosophical shadow), the Cynics developed a series of strategies for sustaining their individual liberty without challenging the authorities through direct political action. The principle of autarkeia (selfsufficiency) enabled them to parry society's corrupting carrot and their patently ludic, purposeless behavior its punishing stick. By turning, in a zero-sum game, the sum into another zero, Diogenes made himself invincible: neither had he anything to lose, nor had anybody any reason to fight with him.
Not unlike the Mit'ki, the group of Necrorealists, the second item of Yurchak's Kunstkamera, found its escape from oppositional politics through improvised happenings, spontaneous actions devoid of any obvious meaning. Though such street performances did not violate any existing laws, they ill fit the expectations of the regular Soviet citizen's behavior. Hence their subversive potential, however mitigated. These happenings upset, if only for a fleeing moment, the rigid normative system governing life in Communist society, of which the legal code was just the most coercive variant, and publicly debunked its perceived sacrosanctity. But what makes the Necrorealists truly unique, Yurchak underscores, is the fact that in the process of recording such events they pioneered yet another form of underground art: cinematic samizdat. This fact adds further weight to the argument also made by other contributions, namely, that the logocentric, text-bound understanding of samizdat cannot fully encompass this phenomenon, in its multifaceted diversity.
So much for the essays collected in this issue of Poetics Today. My survey of them fails, however, to convey the heady spirit of the conference I attended in April 2006. Missing are several animated contributions delivered there (the one on the Kraków cabarets is still vivid in my memory) and the inimitable ambiance of adventure that pervaded the entire gathering inside and outside the conference room. The study of samizdat is still in the melting pot, with its basic tenets, terminology, and proper scope very much in flux. Surveying uncharted territory and staking first claims are always galvanizing occasions brimming with enthusiasm. In the collective venture of forging a new scholarly paradigm, the voice of each and every participant added something important to the unique intellectual polyphony, whose echoes, I believe, will resound in the years to come. But what was, and remains, at stake was larger than just the subject of samizdat in itself. The vigorous examination of literature and the arts under unusual conditions of concentrated political repression, which the essays collected here perform with exemplary dexterity, will inevitably influence our understanding of these categories in general, yielding perhaps new, fecund ground for a future dialogue between aesthetics and other social sciences.
